Hegel POS Lecture #13: The Unhappy Consciousness

Word on mechanics - I know a lot of you are writing, and therefore it seems to me that the right way to go is that we will finish this section and do the transition to *Reason* and then stop. I don't know how long it's going to take us to do that. It might be done this week in which case next week I'll have an open session, or it will carry on till next week. I mean, I just don't know, but I think it's probably not wise to try to do *Observing Reason* now, that seems like a big leap and I know you're busy writing therefore you won't be reading about Observing Reason, so let's not pretend. So, the plan is just to finish the Unhappy Consciousness and do the transition to Reason — that's the first five or so pages of the chapter on reason — and we'll pick up there next semester. Any questions?  Good. So whether we're meeting Week 15 or not, we'll just see how it goes.

Okay, last week I gave an account of Stoicism and Skepticism, and what I wanted to argue was that Stoicism and Skepticism were forms of self-consciousness. And in particular, they were forms of divided consciousness. That is, they exemplify the structure of the duality — or Hegel generated, phenomenologically deduced, the duality — between transcendental and empirical consciousness and therefore the duality between universality and particularity, between knowledge and freedom, between truth and being. So, Stoicism and Skepticism — a lot of blank faces. So the claim — just to remind you of the way [inaudible] — was that the Stoic, who is the slave in the mode of knowledge, taking that what freedom the slave has is the freedom of thought. And that thought will represent universality. And that is, in the case of the Stoic, going to be opposed to nature.

And then with the Skeptic, we said that the Skeptic wants to make actual through its effort what was only in principle true in the place of Stoicism. Namely, I am everything and the world is nothing. And therefore the Stoic [*sic* intended: Skeptic] is really a principle of freedom exemplified — why? —  because the Skeptic exemplifies the negativity of consciousness. It takes all of the conceptual phenomenon of Stoicism, gives it a nominalist interpretation — nominalism is the assertion of the primacy of will over knowledge — and then once interpreting it that way, then interprets all universality as convention, all convention as arbitrary, therefore as nothing. So in its freedom, it takes that negativity to be the thought of existence.

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So thought and being are represented by the two aspects of consciousness represented by Stoicism and Skepticism. And this we know in terms of Kantianism, right?  This would be one version of the transcendental self which is self-identical. And that can go either way. That is, it is part of the claim of the transcendental that is indifferently knowledge or will. So that in the relationship between Stoicism and Skepticism you get that uniquely German Idealist equivocation about reason and will. And that the other side becomes the empirical self. And the Skeptic recognizes that it is two-sided in a way that the Stoic repudiates, right? And that's why it recognizes that it needs the empirical stuff in order to negate it.

For those of you who want to think about this distinction, Stoicism and Skepticism, you can have the same claims about God. That is, you can have an either rationalist God or a existentialist God. That is, you can think that — if you're a [inaudible], you say that God is all knowing, because he sees the truth. That is, that's a kind of mystic, Platonic interpretation of God. But if you're an [inaudible], you'll say that God knows the truth because he creates the truth. He makes it true. So there's this continual relationship that then enters into modernity as this tension between knowing and willing.

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And therefore my claim last week was: once we see the origin of the relationship between transcendental and empirical in Skepticism, then we can immediately understand that Kant's construction of the transcendental and empirical distinction is itself necessarily Skeptical. It's a version of Skepticism. It comes out of Skepticism. I further said that Skepticism itself is not an *a priori* or immediate idea but itself we saw as a fully conditioned position within the history of consciousness.

Well, let me present all of that in a different register. And I want to do that in part because you look baffled and in part because there's a lovely account of Stoicism of Skepticism in Stanley Rosen's book *Hegel: An Introduction*. And I like it so much that I thought you should not be deprived of it. And his rhetorical version, I think, will help show you some of the significance of this.

Rosen's way of getting into the problem is to say that Stoicism emerges from slavery — and that’s, remember, the background to all of this, a certain version of slave consciousness. Stoicism emerges from slavery through the rejection of the situation of alienating labor as unreal. So what really motivates Stoicism is the fact that it is divided. It has an experience of its freedom in thinking about how to produce objects, but an experience of deep alienation because it labors to produce objects that are then taken away by the master.

And the only way that a slave can affirm that dawning sense of affirmation that it does have, and the dawning sense of affirmation that it is right to have — it's experience of self-overcoming — is in some way to claim that that moment of the object being taken away does not matter. It is unreal. So the Stoic finds within the thought of the freedom of thinking, the freedom that he is denied in his actual historical world.

And Rosen says something very interesting here. And a surprising thing for him to say of all people. I say that because — as those of you who know Rosen's writing will know, those of you who don't, I'll tell you — he is probably the last living true Platonist who believes completely in intellectual intuition. I've had arguments with him where he'll just, you know, at a certain moment say, 'You have to see it’ — pointing to the ideas. ‘If you don't have the intellectual intuition, then you're just in trouble.’ I keep telling him, 'There's no intuition to have,' and we go back and forth.

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Anyway, so what he has to say here is interesting. He says, at this point we need to understand how Hegel sees the difference between Stoicism and Socratism, or Platonism, or the Socratic tradition. And he says that in general the Socratic tradition, the philosophy of the aristocratic city-state, does not take work seriously. Now there's a famous line by John Dewey, which I much admire, and he says, "Platonism was only possible in a slave society in which some worked and some watched."  That is, only in a world where there were those who were free from labor could the idea that forms or universals had nothing to do with making arise.

So, Platonism is a version of the philosophy of masters. "It is the consolation of the philosopher king” — now I'm quoting — "in daydreaming about the work of his slaves. Platonism avoids the transformation of Stoicism and Skepticism by experiencing the disappearance of self-consciousness or the self-conscious philosopher in the intellectual intuition and the intellectual intuition is a form of death. In being immediately aware of what is unchanging, one is no longer living."

This is why Socrates says, “All life is a preparation for death.” It wasn't an existential thesis; it was an ontological thesis about the meaning of being. Namely, the ideas, and the idea of being at one with the ideas. Therefore — I take it this is Rosen's point — if Socratism is essentially a form of my intellectual intuition of death, then it is intrinsically non-transformable. After all, how can you transform the dead?  So it is no accident that Hegel wants to think about the meaning of thought or reason or universality immediately in relationship to laboring and activity and to think of self-consciousness from the get-go as bound up with transformative activity. Because if that were not the case, then self-consciousness could not have a history, could not be transformable could not, as it were, generate a path.

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Rosen's way of putting this is to say that "The Platonist dies because of his refusal to work. Conversely, the Stoic is born in an incomplete, but nevertheless genuine, human experience of work and gives rise to the Skeptic as a virile expression of his own incertitude.” Stating the same thought somewhat differently, we could say that Platonism is the repudiation of work by a master while Stoicism is a denial of the significance of work by a slave.

So the first thing to understand is why it is, how it is, that Hegel has given us the history he has. A history that bizarrely again begins with modern epistemology, moves into a kind of mythic setting of the master and slave, and suddenly emerges in the midst of something like the Roman world. And it is a significant fact about the Phenomenology, one you will not mistake, that Socrates/Platonism never appear.  That what appear is Greek tragedy and Greek art, Greek poetry, the Greek city-state, but never Platonism.

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So it might say that, for us moderns, philosophy is only possible by turning our back on Platonism. There's nothing to be said to it, of it or by it. That's an exaggeration. And Hegel will have another moment where he will talk about Socrates differently. But when Socrates appears for Plato as significant, he appears not as a Platonist but as of version of a conscientious objector. That is, someone who has a conscience and dies or sacrifices himself for the truth. So Socrates in that sense becomes a version of a modern subject. Significantly, no Plato. It's all Neo-Aristotelian all the way through. Make of that what you will.

Well, one of the things you must make of it is that the notion of work and labor which we're going to come back to today is absolutely central to the entire Hegelian project. Something that Marx recognized and misrecognizes, I'll come back to later this evening.

So Stoicism is the first effort of the slave to transform himself into a master. And he does so, well, he does so mostly by dream. And in that respect he remains within the horizon of Platonism, but of course because of the construction of his dreaming — namely as a denial of the significance of work — also outside of it. The essence of the whole — and this is what makes him within the horizon of Platonism — is thought separated from life. So it is — and I want to be careful here — it is not freedom itself, but the concept of freedom that the Stoic embraces. The thought of freedom.

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So the Stoic is form without content. The Stoic incorporates the results of his work in thought in a negative sense only, that is by denying its significance. Rosen contends that for Hegel this is an incomplete negation, since the content of the real world is preserved only as determination as such, or the very idea of determination, but without actual determinacy. This means that the content of thought has been has been transformed, I want to say, into a formal structure.

I think it's useful to think of the Stoic as a kind of analytic philosopher interested in logical structures, maybe someone like Badiou, to think of a bad philosopher. I can't resist. When you can take an easy shot, go for it. The point is that it's food for thought, these structures, not food for living. That they only work at the level of thought and cannot be transformed into existential structures, by their very character, right, by their very character. That's what made me interested in Badiou and his ideas of set theory.

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So the Stoic believes that he has escaped from the world of nature and from the impulsions of physical reality by ignoring the details, by lacking empirical content, by thinking of it only in general, or Hegel puts it as the true or the good, or the set of all sets, or the infinite. The Skeptic, on the other hand, completes the negation of the world through the negative work of analytic thinking. And does so in the manner I described earlier.

The problem with Skepticism is that because the Skeptic is himself the product of his own work, then the Skeptic shows that he himself is also of no significance. That is, he has no way of pulling himself out of his own negative doubt about everything else and therefore he has no way of affirming the force of his own power of negation since it ends up swallowing itself.

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So it becomes a kind of empty negativity. And the empty negativity produces a kind of emptiness, a kind of Stoicism if you wish. And hence you get another version of the inverted world: the rise of the Stoic produces the Skeptic, and the assertion of Skepticism produces Stoicism. It's there that we ended last week. Any questions before I press on, [inaudible] about Stoicism and Skepticism?

Student:  A lot of the time when we're talking about Stoicism and Skepticism, we're talking about the slave's negative attitude towards work and that seems right to me. But you also pointed out this other detail, namely that both the master and the slave have a negative attitude towards the slave [inaudible] relationship and you pointed out rightly, I think, we're supposed to see Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus as both potentially Stoics. So I think I'm clear on how the slave gets to [inaudible], I guess the question is I'm not really clear on why the master would be a Stoic?  I mean especially if Rosen's right, why — or am I wrong to think that the master is a Stoic?

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Bernstein:  Hegel actually says two things. So I don't know [inaudible]. So on the one hand when he actually is pressed on the historical specificity of the moment, he says that it could arise only in the time of universal slavery. So on the one hand he imagines that the whole thing is a world in which actual freedom, as opposed to the idea of freedom, could not get a grip, could not find traction. And that's his official historical story.

Student: [inaudible]

Bernstein:  I'm not saying there aren't masters, I'm saying that he's suggesting that the master and the slave are in an analogous predicament, right? In the sense that some idea of freedom by the experience of slavery has arisen but that freedom has not been able to find a mechanism for itself. It's important to remember — think about this — Stoicism is a wonderful political philosophy in the sense that it is the first fully cosmopolitan political philosophy and it contains the earliest offenses of cosmopolitan thinking and therefore the fullest offenses of — and here's the crux — of the equality of all human beings.

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So the notion of freedom that arose in the Roman World by a Stoical philosophy had about it a, let's call it a political ideality, that had to reverberate on both masters and slaves in a sense. The world plainly didn't match up to its own pretensions to universals. Now why should that matter?  Now is second point — so that's the historical point — the second bit is to recall that Hegel thinks that the crux of the master-slave relationship is a structure of individual self-consciousness. That is, the upshot of the master-slave, the way it emerges as Stoicism, is emerges as a structure of individual self-understanding with master and slave moments to it.

So he's imagining, I take it, that in these circumstances that that form of self-consciousness was available to everyone. And that therefore there need not have been —  I just want to say need not have been — an intrinsic difference between the attitudes of actual masters and actual slaves. Therefore — of course there might have been some masters, right, who we might say are old-fashioned masters, and in fact, we think of Roman history as actually scattered with them, right?  The ones who think they're God and fiddle in all that, and others who imbibe exactly what we think of as the dictates of Roman philosophy. And that's all, I think, Hegel needs. That is, he needs the two pieces: an historical thesis about why anyone in such a world might inhabit one of these two positions, and an account of the fact that master-slave become the structural attitudes. Not about actual masters and actual slaves, but forms of individual self-consciousness.

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Student: When we go to the end of the master and slave section we said from, you know — the master is stuck in terms of self-development. He has all of his needs taken care of and, you know, he he has a kind of inferior form of recognition but some form of recognition in which he can confirm himself. So whereas the slave on the other hand sees in working on the object that — I mean, he somehow comes to externalize according to his idea. And that's the mechanism that makes him realize, 'Selves can be transformed. There are things that can be worked on: the ideas.'  But I'm not seeing, if the master has all his needs taken care of — and this is such important point to emphasize — that he's kind of spiritually atrophied in a way, how he could ever get into this game of being split, being split between being a master and slave?

Bernstein: And I hope that that's that's the point of the historical thesis. Okay, Hegel just thinks, if there's a world of servitude or a world of unfreedom, then the kind of freedom that the slave possesses becomes attractive to everyone. And if you want, you can think about it in this way, part of Hegel's and nearly everyone else's view about Rome is there was only one free person. Whatever that might mean. The very idea of empire and emperor. And that raises problems for everyone with respect to the notion of freedom. And that's why Hegel thinks of it as a culture of domination. There's no full recognition.

Other questions about Stoicism and Skepticism?

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Okay.

Student:  Can we return to the notion of boredom? And the idea is the lack of determination from the point of view of the Stoic reveals itself [inaudible]. How something determinate comes out of something that lacks any determinacy?

Bernstein: I think Paul's thought is is the one that probably does most of the work. That is, boredom is a determinacy. If you think of every formation of boredom, if you think of Madame Bovary, if you think of [inaudible] asceticism, if you think — you can go through each, if you think of the way Heidegger talks about boredom in the *1929 lectures*, if, you know — each of these occasions, boredom actually is a specific mood. A failure to find the world contentful. So it's a mood that is the result, and therefore a determinate result.

So it's not the same — in other words, it would only be empty if it was the same as Stoicism. But Hegel's account is it's the upshot of the Stoical movement. It's the upshot of that and therefore it's a determinate negation, right, it puts you in a mood that you don't want. Namely, instead of ataraxia, you're in boredom. And then you have — if you're in boredom, you have to negate it, and now you're starting to be a Skeptic, even to hold onto Stoicism, because now you have to negate the determinacy of boredom as the way in which you are both in and not in the world.

So, I mean, here's another way. The emptiness of thought is not itself empty. It's not itself a matter of indifference. On the contrary, the Stoic wanted something very deep out of the formality of thought. Wanted to hold on to a certain type of indifference and didn't think of that as boredom at all. The original project was a form of virtue. So it's the coming over of a mood that reveals the hollowness of your own thinking. That is, it's a determinant mood revealing a certain kind of emptiness.

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Student: If the thought and will coincide in Stoicism was the non-determinacy of will...

Bernstein: Right.

Student: …[inaudible] when does the will suddenly become determinate again?

Bernstein:  [inaudible] or needs to become determinate. Needs to do something, needs to shake itself up. It can't, they can't stay with thoughts. So mood here, I want to say, has all the affectivity of a Heideggerian mood, in that sense. It really is world-revealing but it reveals a certain kind of failure of existential engagement just as it does in Heidegger. Indeed, one might suppose [inaudible].

Okay, so. Now what we want to do, in thinking about the Unhappy Consciousness — it's very, very tricky — is we want to see it as coping with this problem in all its philosophical significance. And I say that it's a kind of challenge because, as we know, Hegel buries his account in this odd account of Medieval Christianity. So we're going to have to think hard about what's going on and to try to decode the philosophical meaning of each of these moments and indeed decode the structure as a whole.

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Well the Unhappy Consciousness arises he says, I think convincingly, as the form of consciousness, that accepts both moments empirical and transcendental — ‘I am both. I am a divided consciousness. That's what I am.’ — and hence accepts and recognizes itself as divided. That's what the Skeptic didn't do. The Skeptic wants to say, 'I'm not divided. I am essentially freedom. I’m essentially negativity and the empirical is nothing.'  The empirical is not nothing. So the Unhappy Consciousness is the acknowledgement of itself as a fractured being. Half caught in the sensory world of life, embodied and finite, and half in the unchanging world of pure thoughts, which now becomes or is thought of as an unchanging beyond.

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Second paragraph of paragraph 206, "In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself. In Skepticism,  this freedom becomes a reality, negates the other side of determinate existence, but really duplicates *itself*, and now knows itself to be a duality. Consequently, the duplication, which formerly was divided between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in one.”

So this is the completion of the movement I was talking to Adam about. That is, the two moments of lord and serf in one consciousness have now officially arrived in one form of consciousness that understands itself to be both exactly, to be a fractured consciousness that is both truly master and truly slave.

"The duplication of self-consciousness within itself, which is the essential in the Notion of Spirit, is thus here before us, but not yet in its unity: The Unhappy Consciousness is the consciousness of self as a dual-natured and merely contradictory being."

So we're going to understand Christianity as essentially contradictory being, as essentially the experience of the self as a kind of contradictory being.

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Now in order to think of yourself as a divided consciousness, the question is, how are you going to do that? How are you going to make sense of your experience? How are you going to articulate it? And Hegel's unequivocal thought — that runs, by the way, throughout this book and we're going to come back to it again in a different way in the chapter on religion —  is the genius of Christianity is its subtlety and complexity in thinking about human beings as essentially forms of divided consciousness. That is, it's the first form of consciousness that really saw that as problematic, that didn't simply start with, you know, 'Oh a myth. We were once unborn souls and we got born. Bad news. Eventually, we'll get back there.'

No, you know, there's a problem here and the problem is: how are these two moments going to be connected?  And Christianity bites the bullet that this is a thought and a problem that needs to be thought through. That's the glory of Christianity. By the way, it never gets there. Never figures it out, but it's fascinating. It's forms of failure are going to be indicative of who we are.

So thinking about the forms, if Christianity is essentially a deep thinking in the form of ritual, in the form of practice, in the form — so Hegel thinks, and we want to be clear, that practices, belief systems, cultural practices, the sacraments, the rituals of Christianity, and particular events, and here the Crusades will be an event, need to be interpreted as thoughts. As categorial thoughts. And what I mean by categorial thoughts, is thoughts designed to solve real intransigent, categorical problems. Namely, in this case, well in part, the problem between mind and body, between thought and existence, between freedom and reality.

So what is Christianity's thought? Paragraph 207. "The Unhappy Consciousness itself…” — which again is a single undivided consciousness with a dual nature. “The Unhappy Consciousness itself *is* the gazing of one self-consciousness into another, and itself *is* both.”

Have to hold on to that sentence, typical Hegelian sentence. It is one self-consciousness, namely the empirical self-consciousness, gazing into another self-consciousness, the transcendental ego — or now he's going to call changeable consciousness and unchangeable — and is both.  Gazing of one self consciousness into another self-consciousness and is both.

Student: [inaudible]

Bernstein: Okay, no, part of it has to be the thought that it is both, because it doesn't think of the other as simply another outside of it, but rather the other as its truth. My truth is God. God is my creator. He is my source. I am founded in God. I am made by God. My being exists for God. And at some point the difference between my life down here and God will be united. We'll be a couple, we'll be a team, we’ll make it. We'll make it. That's a happy moment in the life of Unhappy Consciousness. We call it the honeymoon, right? It's only downhill from there.

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The other point I want to make is there is no beyond. Just to remind you, there is no beyond. So whatever we know about the beyond is what the concrete consciousness thinks about the beyond. So everything that's important about the beyond comes from how the Christian soul thinks about it. So there is going to be — and I think of a great deal of Hegel is actually a form of a joke.

It's a joke that I first heard in a movie with Peter O'Toole called *The Ruling Class*. Anyone know that movie?  Great movie that seems to have to have disappeared. It's a bizarre, baroque movie about the British class system and Peter O’Toole is a mad aristocrat who comes to believe he's God. And finally, someone says to him, 'Why do you think you're God? That's insane.'  'It's easy, whenever I'm praying, I discover I'm talking to myself.'

That's the entire structure of this chapter. That joke is the structure of this chapter. That every attempt to get outside the self is going to be a reversion back into the self, so that the attempt to affirm oneself as other is always going to be an act of self-affirmation. Jokes can take us a fair way.

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Student: This is reminding me of a lot of *The Spirit of Christianity* [inaudible]. Is Hegel thinking of that again?

Bernstein: He's going to be thinking of that. The way it's going to happen here, for reasons that I'll come to, and I'll come to in paragraph 210 — the way it comes here is as a moment in the history of Christianity itself. So Judaism appears here — at least in this chapter, it's slightly differently in chapter on religion — in this chapter it appears as Paul's past. He was [inaudible - perhaps "he was once a slave"]. So that's the moment. So it's a moment in Christianity, it's a moment of the Trinity. The Father.

So yeah, it's obviously an analogous problematic but really set to very different purposes here. Again, the purposes, again, have to pick up this problem of embodiment, labor, work, existence, freedom — all these problems have to come back and [inaudible]. And therefore different than they were in *Spirit of Christianity*.

So the structure, Hegel suggests, paragraph 208, is that this immediate unity — I am both — needs some articulation. And therefore the articulation comes by thinking of the unchangeable as the essential being, and the other, the protean and changeable, it takes to be the unessential. So I'm saying Christianity arises by taking a strategy,  I suggested last week, is the opposite of both Stoicism and Skepticism. They both wanted to claim their essentiality directly and repudiate their moments of empiricism.

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Christianity begins with its moment of empiricism, its unessentiality, and thinks of its essence as what is to be achieved or what it is to be connected with. So the motions of Christianity begin with, as it were, the problem of how a merely finite — and again, this is part of the genius of Christianity — a merely finite, merely changeable, merely fallen, etc., being can nonetheless be truly self-conscious. That is, be in touch with what makes the world one with universality and truth.

So it's an Unhappy Consciousness. Its unhappiness is the thought that it's going to begin from the side of the changeable and try to put itself in relationship to the unchanging.

Student: How's that not a version of Stoicism?

Bernstein: Because it's an effort. There's no intellectual intuition. In other words, Platonism is an explanation of how we are in touch. Christianity, on this attempt, is a series of efforts to bring the two into contact, to reconcile them. So, how do I want to say it?  Christianity is Platonism as brought within the world of work and not outside of it. So it's a Platonism that no longer has as a premise the repudiation of work. It can't because it's beginning with the empirical moment.

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Student: I think that I want to ask a [inaudible] question there. So Adorno does the history of metaphysics and he says, you know, Plato divides up these two worlds, but he doesn't connect the two worlds. So that's not metaphysics, we don't have metaphysics until Aristotle. Aristotle actually connects these two. But the problem there is, as soon as we connect the particular with the universal, we want to say the universal is the more important and so, etc. In that case, why don't we get the Unhappy Consciousness until Christianity? Why don't we just find it as soon as we have Aristotle? Plato: Stoicism, Skepticism. Okay, but then as soon as we've got Aristotle where we began with the empirical world, then don't we have the Unhappy Consciousness?

Bernstein:  Ernst Bloch, in a beautiful book, The Principle of Hope, says there are two models of human self-realization in western philosophy. The first is the Aristotelian, the idea of the virtuous man. The self-sufficient man. The man who is complete in himself, etc. The other is Christ on the cross. Aristotelianism is a kind of Stoicism, isn't very unhappy, still inhabits [inaudible] a world of slavery. I mean we can go on and on. So as much as we Aristotelians love Aristotle, he participated in a Platonic world in all sorts of ways.

So you need the dynamism. And it's not an accident — I should say, you know, you ought to think about the history of sociology. It's always about the history of religion, history of Christianity, because it has been the dynamic moving force of western thought. It needed Greek philosophy. Christianity would be nowhere without Greek philosophy, but it's Christianity that sets it into motion. That makes it a secularizing process.

And that's what Hegel's interested in here. He's actually interested in how Christianity itself as religion is essentially secularizing. That's what distinguishes it from all other religions. And that will become even more evident in the chapter on religion where he really describes all the religions and thinks that Christianity is superior precisely for that reason. Christianity is already a form of atheism. I take that to be a truism but obviously it doesn't go without saying and I'll say it next semester.

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All right. Let me see if I can finish a paragraph 208 anyway, and then we'll have a break. We then get into the structure, a little bit of the structure of the chapter.

So Hegel describes from the get-go in paragraph 208 what the movement of this relationship between the changeable and the unchangeable is going to be. There are no surprises here and he wants to make that palpable. So he says — this is the very end of the paragraph —  "The attitude it assigns to both cannot therefore be one of mutual indifference, i.e. it cannot itself be indifferent towards the Unchangeable; rather, it is itself directly both of them, and the relation of the two is for it a relation of essential being to the unessential, so that this latter has to be set aside.” Christianity is the practice of how we can set aside the unessential moment. “But since” — here's the problem, again what I just, this is the logical joke — “but since for it both are equally essential and contradictory, it is merely the contradictory movement in which one opposite does not come to rest in its opposite, but in it only produces itself afresh as an opposite.”

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So the claim here, is that the structure of Christianity — which later on I will suggest to you Butler shows is equally the structure of conscious life in Freud, the same structure — is an essentially contradictory structure in which you have an essential moment, which is, let's call it, the universal, unchanging and ideal, and a second moment which is empirical, finite, living and moving, changeable. Changeable is an important word here. And therefore if you suppose that your essence — you are this finite being, but this other is your essence, then the trick will be: how can I set myself aside?  How can I get rid of, shed, my empirical being in order to allow me to realize my unchanging essence?  And because the structure of that, how can I, as finite, do the setting aside?  Well, the doing is a finite work and therefore every effort of setting aside is going to be another moment in which I affirm my own finitude.

So the very act of trying to overcome my finite, bodily, empirical existence insists upon it, doubles it, makes it more insistent, more palpable. And we'll see this reaches comic extremes in Luther in the Caribbean. You missed that bit, I can see from your faces. You didn't see that sentence. We will come back to it. Let us have a break.

[BREAK]

So paragraph 209 explains why this is going to be an engagement with Christianity, not with any of the other axial religions. So Hegel writes, and it's an interesting argument, “Here, then, we have a struggle against an enemy, to vanquish whom is really to suffer defeat…”

Just great, soon as you win, you lose; i.e., if the enemy is my body, if I vanquish it, then I've lost everything. So,

“…where victory in one consciousness is really lost in its opposite. Consciousness of life, its existence and activity, is only an agonizing over this existence and activity, for therein it is conscious that its essence is only its opposite, is conscious only of its own nothingness. Raising itself out of this consciousness it goes over into the Unchangeable; but this elevation is itself this same consciousness. It is, therefore, directly consciousness of the opposite, namely of itself as a particular individual. The Unchangeable that enters into consciousness is through this very fact at the same time affected by individuality, and is only present with the latter; individuality, instead of having been extinguished in the consciousness of the Unchangeable, only continues to arise therefrom."

So this is a dialectical deduction of the existence of Jesus. I'm sure you all got that immediately. How come?  Well, Hegel's thought here is that I want to identify myself with the unchangeable and therefore I want to approach it. And the only way I can approach it, [inaudible] discovered, is by renouncing my finite existence. But the renunciation of my finite existence turns out to be an assertion of my finite existence. That is, the act of renunciation is existentially self-defeating.

In that sense it has the structure of Cartesian cogito, equally a type of existentially self-defeating performance. Now, that makes the thought of individuality, so the thought is — this is Hegel doing the joke — 'When I think of approaching the unchangeable, what I become aware of is particularity. Therefore in order to even think about approaching the unchangeable the unchangeable must have itself the form of singular particularity.'

We might put the thought this way: that the only way that the very activity of approaching the unchangeable necessarily particularizes it, makes it a singular one. And of course you may say this is obvious. Hegel thinks it is obvious. Why?  Because he suggested the condition for approach had better be that the unchangeable inhabits the same ontological realm as the changeable. Otherwise, how am I going to approach it?  I can't avoid my particularity. Every renunciation of it brings the thought of my particularity back. Then, any possibility of reaching out to the unchangeable has as its condition of possibility that the unchangeable too be affected by particularity.

[00:05:50]

In religious discourse we call this the Incarnation. That the universal, the unchangeable, must be incarnated in order to be contacted. So for Christianity, and therefore for the Unhappy Consciousness as a whole, there is an experience of the emergence of individuality in the unchangeable and of the unchangeable in individuality. So that individuality and unchangeableness are not contrasts. So Hegel says in paragraph 210 — and I want to be clear. Let me say something about how this chapter works. I'm not going to finish this today.

Paragraph 210 and 211 and a little bit of 212 but above all paragraphs 210 and 211 give us the structure of the Unhappy Consciousness in general and show us that, in ways that I'll elaborate in just one moment, that the Unhappy Consciousness in general has three moments roughly corresponding to: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. And for reasons that are going to be particular to our setting here, the discussion we're interested in is only going to be discussion of the second moment.

[00:08:18]

Now that's important because it shows that in working through the Unhappy Consciousness here, we're not working through the whole of the Unhappy Consciousness. Rather the Unhappy Consciousness, as I'll come to, is again going to be something that belongs to the whole structure of the text in a certain way. And in ways I've already tried to suggest to you about Stoicism and Skepticism, belongs to the structure of self-consciousness. That is, even after Hegelian wisdom arrives, there will still be Unhappy Consciousnesses. It’s a constant temptation of reason.

So, paragraph 210, and maybe the best way to deal with this is a diagram. In paragraph 210, the argument is the Unhappy Consciousness has three moments. One is an unchanging essence, facing — the arrows are facing or in relationship to — and a changeable particular, a changeable One. And that's the thought of God the Father, and if you want, of Judaism. And will always emerge as something that is past, over and done with. The second moment is a changeable One that is in connection with an unchangeable essence that is also a singular One.

And that's going to be — so the thought here is the argument I just gave you,  Namely, this makes reconciliation possible because both of these by being One, by being particulars, are in the same world. That they both belong to the world of finite time and history. So this is obviously the thought of the Son and is probably the moment of Medieval Catholicism. And if you want to give it a temporal account, it's going to be present, although that's gonna be tricky.

[00:12:14]

And then thirdly — and all of this is going to come back for Hegel, so he really thinks of all this as significant — you're going to have a changeable One that is already also unchangeable in relationship to, now, an unchangeable essence that is already a changeable One. And that of course, for Hegel, is the Holy Spirit. And has, in his interpretation, is the proper — and I want to be careful about this — interpretation of Protestantism, his version of Lutheranism, whatever that means.

Now, and so therefore most of the text is actually going to be about the third moment. Now what's important about these three, just so we're aware of where we are, is that they represent three ways of thinking about the relationship between transcendental and empirical consciousness. Each of them, again, must be understood as metaphorical or elaborated accounts of moments of self-consciousness itself. So that, Hegel's thought here is that, so if you want to think about it this way, changeable consciousness is always going to be the for-itself, unchangeable consciousness is the in-itself, and the relationship between those two moments is the in-itself and for-itself.

[00:15:30]

And it turns out that this has multiple forms. It's not just one thing. And each of these themselves have multiple forms inside of them. He just wants to keep the complexity going. And again, just to remind you, what this represents are variations on the structure of self-consciousness itself. So Christianity, again to repeat, is a working out of the structure of human self-consciousness as a divided consciousness.

John Russon, very nicely in his book, page 24, says, "The Unhappy Consciousness does not refer to a single static form of the relation to the unchangeable, but refers rather to the basic conception of self-consciousness as a syllogism..."  That is, for-itself, in-itself and the relation between the two, [inaudible] a syllogism. Russon, “...and to the intrinsical logical dynamic by which the relation develops."

So in paragraph 210, what Hegel is reminding us with the 'first secondly thirdly' are these three forms. Furthermore, just as a reminder, that the logical exposition in the experience of the Unhappy Consciousness is also, and must be, simultaneously the history of the unchangeable.

[00:18:00]

It just follows doesn't it? So this is what Hegel argues in paragraph 211. So you can think of it on the one hand as the Unhappy Consciousness going through different relations to the unchangeable, or you can think of it as the history of the unchangeable taking different forms. You can read it from either side. And you can read it from either side why?  Again, because the Unhappy Consciousness is both. So it's going to embed, so every —  remember our principle in the first introduction: every change in the form of consciousness is a change in the object. So the changes in the relationship to the unchangeable generate different formations of the object. Just that thought.

So Hegel says paragraph 211, "What is set forth here as the mode and relationship of the Unchangeable has appeared as the experience through which the divided self-consciousness passes in its wretchedness. Now…"  So the first expression is, 'think of all this as the syllogism of self-consciousness.'  “Now,” he says, "this experience, it is true, is not its own one-sided movement…” This is not, again, this can't be just me taking different views of the same unchanging object.

[00:20:03]

So this can't be just one-sided for “…it is itself…” — it is itself, as if we didn't know this already, but now he tells us —  “…it is itself the unchangeable...” The very point Katie was making in break, that what makes this dynamic significant is the idea of the unchangeable matters. [inaudible] the unchangeable, it's the moment of universality, it's the moment of essence. It's just that Christianity has a bad conception of it, thinks of it as a beyond. But consciousness, in trying to think of it as a beyond, is thinking about something that is itself true. Namely the notion of the unchangeable of universality, of freedom, of self-determination.

It's thinking about it in a false way, but the falseness is not merely its getting the wrong attitude towards an independent existing object. Rather, because it is that object — we're in the realm of self-consciousness, remember in this chapter — it is itself its own object because it is itself unchangeable consciousness. And this consequently is at the same time a particular individual consciousness too, just to rub it in. And the movement is just as much the movement of the unchangeable consciousness, which makes an appearance in that movement as much as the other. That is, it's also the history moving from, and of course it's moving from, the Lord, to Son and Brother, to Spirit. And this will be different ways in which we actually experience it, its changings. So he says, all of this is a bit premature, and we have to work through what's going to be the second moment.

[00:22:30]

Are we okay on the structure thus far? Yeah.

Student: I'm having trouble, [inaudible] what i'm really having trouble with is this notion of the unchangeable. [inaudible] The notion of the unchangeable doesn't make sense to me and then when we think of the history of it having different forms, how can it have different forms and still be unchangeable?

Bernstein: First thing you remember: we're thinking about ourselves. All this is about us. We already know that. This is called self-consciousness. And we're thinking, above all, about the dual structure of consciousness: transcendental and empirical. Now, Hegel's claim

is that that human self-understanding, which Kant called the transcendental and empirical, with that structure (transcendental and empirical), which is self-consciousness, is in fact to be understood through a series of a certain type of emergent forms. And what the first reminder tells us is: we're transcendental and empirical in part because we're self-conscious beings, because we're intersubjective beings. And the originary experience of intersubjectivity is the master-slave.

So, when we're thinking about these moments — and this is why the whole of Hegel's text is a palimpsest. You have to kind of get used to reading palimpsests. So whenever you have an unchangeable essence, you're going to have the moment of mastery and that's going to signify something. The moment of mastery is going to signify the moment of independence, and it's going to signify the moment of universality, and etc. So that's what these notions signify.

[00:26:00]

Now as they emerge out of the master-slave, they went through a series of formations. Stoicism, Skepticism and now this. This is just another formation of the same stuff. This is just another — this is still the chapter on self-consciousness. So the claim is that Christianity is a way of thinking about the self. That's what Christianity is here. And it's a way of thinking about the self under a particular problematic; namely, as a divided consciousness. And it's an attempt to work through that, through a series of cultural practices.

Now since most of us have some naive conception of mind-body dualism, which is the other version of what's at stake here. And this is a way of thinking about that as it actually developed and as it actually became or introduced the modern self or modern reason. The evidence is going to be modern reason and modern science.

So this is a story about how you would be under — so what's the problem here?  So what we're trying to do, each and every form of consciousness is trying to authorize itself and make sense, if in the mode of self-consciousness, that its authority is: 'I am the essence of the world,' [inaudible] of self consciousness. 'I'm everything.'  Desire, consume it all. And we have all these variations. Well Christianity is just a big version of 'I am everything.'  Namely, God says, 'I am everything,' but God is just a way in which human beings conceive of themselves where they conceive of God as their essence.

[00:26:35]

So the thought is you don't have to — Hegel says, explicitly, we're on the side of the Skeptic. He says, we don't know what anything is in the beyond. All we know is the Unhappy Consciousness's self-understanding of itself, as it transforms itself in trying to understand itself as a divided consciousness. Any better?

Student:  It's a little better. I guess, when I'm thinking of the unchangeable I'm really thinking of a notion of God as reason, or the unchangeable truth, or something?

Bernstein:  That's one of the things it becomes. But I mean think about *The Genealogy of Morals*, just to remind you of an obvious text.  *The Genealogy of Morals* begins, "We knowers are unknown to ourselves."  Why does it begin that way?  Because he assumes we knowers are sure of one thing: God is dead. There is no God. That's one thing we knowers, we know, psychologists and reason, we all know that. And at the end of the text he says, "Oh there's this one final belief: truth."

[00:30:10]

So it turns out that we who thought we were beyond religion still have religion, namely we believe in truth. So he's following, so Nietzsche's following *The Genealogy of Moral's* ideas of essence, the truth of the self, God to rational science. Hegel is doing it as Nietzsche does it, not in terms of asking 'what is true' because we're already beyond that, that was Consciousness, that's a hopeless question. Now we're asking, we know the truth is self-consciousness, that we can only understand the meaning of reality by understanding ourselves. And this is a formation of our self, of which another version will be Reason and the *a priori*. You are absolutely right. So Reason will happen — reason will be natural science, it will also be the moral law. I'm immediately aware of moral truth, immediately aware of moral truth. Immediately aware. There's no gap, it's a rationalist account.

These are just again self-conceptions, and what makes Hegel important, I think, is that he says, ‘Look, not all the important self-perceptions of human beings have come from philosophy.'  That important self-conceptions happen elsewhere. They happen in religion, in natural science, in politics and beyond. So in philosophy — and all of them are thinking, they're forms of thinking about how the world is.

[00:32:30]

Safe to move on?

Student:  [inaudible] What exactly would be the difference between a singularity that's also the universal unchangeable and a universal unchangeable that’s also a singularity?

Bernstein: Yeah, the point of this structure is what I just argued, that the history of the One also has to be the history of the other and that we have to then come to see that they are the same history. And once we come to see that they are the same history, then we recognize ourselves.

Turns out that's a bit more complicated than that. But you're right, it's that, or as Hegel is going to do, is the history of Spirit and history of religion are going to have to recognize themselves as the same history. Hegel calls it absolute knowing. So this is a version — eventually, this will transmogrify into a form of absolute knowing.

Paragraph 212. These are all — we're still in the introductory paragraphs. We're not really in Unhappy Consciousness yet. It really doesn't start until paragraph 215, 216. The actual phenomenological analysis. So what he does in paragraph 212 is simply explicate what this relationship, the second one, is all about. And he begins to focus in on it, because that's going to be the topic of the remainder of the chapter.

[00:34:49]

So he says, give or take, that as an object, the unchangeable consciousness remains a separate being. God is, for this consciousness —  does he ever use the term God in this chapter?  No, I don't think he does. It's always changeable, unchangeable, isn't it?  Which I think [inaudible]. So and of course that's part of what he's doing. He's trying to remind us of the philosophical stakes always, so that at least we're aware always that there's a philosophical moment, whatever the evident religious subtext is.

So, the Incarnation, the unchangeable consciousness becoming a particular, is here recognized as an event. It's something that happens. It's not structural. It's an event, it's an historical, happens at a time and place. Which already of course means that there's something about this that is unthought. And that we, conversely, are fallen by nature. Our nature is to be separated from unchangeable consciousness. And therefore our salvation will come only by means of grace. I'm sorry, our salvation will come not only by means of grace, but because we will it.

So there has to be something that the other does — give us grace, forgive us our sins — and something that we do. He knows whether you've been naughty or nice. So the antithesis, and here's Hegel's's point, even if God comes to save all mankind — you know, God sends his only Son to redeem all mankind — that's not the end of the story. I mean, I know those of us who worry about the modern world wish that had been the end of the story, over and done with, finish. But it's not, because there's something that's still asked of us. Namely, we have to put ourselves in relationship to this event. About that Kierkegaard was right.

[00:38:21]

There is an event we have to do something about. So the antithesis, and here's the point, even when God becomes himself finite and singular, the antithesis persists. So the fact that this [indicates something on board] happens does not solve the problem from here. That's what — you know, remind yourselves — that's what the early Christians thought, right?  This was the problem. And once the event of the Incarnation happened, the problem was solved. We are saying this, but if the structure is right — and you can now see it as structural — then there's still a problem, because changeable consciousness is still different from essence, even though essence has itself become singular.

So the antithesis still exists. And because the antithesis exists, then the opposition between here and yonder actually becomes more fundamental. For although the unchangeable becomes incarnate, it became a single physical individual at some time in the past. And because it happened sometime in the past, then we have to hope for a reconciliation with it at some time in the future. So the very idea of a temporal schema here, which I began with, already breaks down immediately. That is, thinking about God the Father as the past, God the Son as the present, and the Holy Spirit as the future — that breaks down because the present is a past present, which entails the need for a different future, and therefore the notion of a beyond or the like remain.

[00:41:17]

Nonetheless, it sets the task. And the task now is, because of the Incarnation, the Unhappy Consciousness must strive to live by the law of the unchangeable. He must come to live in Christ or find a way of being or living in Christ in general. Now in order to think about this — and now I want to sketch out the structure of the rest of the chapter — schematically, the second version of the Unhappy Consciousness is going to take three, surprise surprise, fundamental forms towards Christ, towards the unchangeable consciousness.

And they are — these are the three moments — devotion, sacramental work and desire, and self-mortification. Each of these are ways of enacting or performing — the point of each of these is that they are ways of enacting or performing the thought of the inessentiality of this life and of the essentiality of the beyond.

So Hegel says, this is paragraph 213, "our efforts are now directed rather to setting aside its relationship with the pure formless Unchangeable, and to coming into relation only with the Unchangeable in its embodied or incarnate form...The initially external relation to the incarnate Unchangeable as an alien reality has to be transformed into a relation in which it becomes absolutely one with it.” The goal is to become absolutely one with it.

[00:44:05]

So, and now we know the structure of this. Paragraph 214 gives the three moments I just gave, and we know that the structure of these three moments is all going to be the same. Namely that, in order to do this, the Unhappy Consciousness must continually suppress the fact — that is, embodiment or its activity and work can never have the purity of the unchangeable. So the intent to continually suppress itself in favor of the other will, hence, continually recharge or reaffirm the very contingency and embodiment of its own life. And notice pure consciousness is like a Stoical moment. Sacramental desire and labor is like a Skeptical moment. And then self-mortification will be a transfigurative moment.

Okay devotion, which is paragraph 217. And again, I hope here, at least in this this stretch of Hegel, Hegel does find this comic and and I hope you were at least a little amused. So let me say how the structure of devotion works and then I will look at the text. What happens in this —  so this is the notion of pure thought corresponds to [inaudible] the unchangeable as an object. So here the Unhappy Consciousness turns directly toward the individual form of the unchanging, and it absorbs that awareness into its intellect.

Now what's important here is a certain passivity. So there's no attempt here to comprehend the unchanging by reflective thought. Rather, it surrenders itself to the immediacy of intellectual feeling and intuition. And here — this is near the beginning of paragraph 217. So Hegel says, well not here, [inaudible] have to back up. This is not a pure thinking individuality, "it is only a movement towards thinking, and so is devotion. It's thinking as such is no more than the chaotic jingling of bells, or a mist of warm incense, a musical thinking that does not get as far as the Notion, which would be the sole, immanent objective mode of thought."`

That's low Hegelian comedy, but I think pretty good, and it's even better when you recognize that he's doing two things at once. That of course he is thinking about the Catholic Mass, and — when is the moment when the bell is hit in the Catholic? [inaudible] So, it’s the Eucharist. It's the actual moment of the appearance of Christ. He hits the bell. How do you know it's Christ?  Ding!  That's what I thought.

It is also the philosophy of early German Romanticism. It is Jacobi and Schleiermacher who think that feeling is the only and the necessary relationship to the beyond. So although — so by using this notion of pure thought, and thinking that the meaning of pure thought is a feeling of immediacy in relationship to the beyond, he's not just having a moment of the history of Christianity, but trying again, as I suggested before, to get at a structure, a continual temptation. And indeed, it's a temptation which those of us who, God bless them, have friends who are hippies will recognize easily as a recurrent human temptation. Okay.

[00:50:25]

So the first movement here is this reduction to feeling and immediacy, which also should remind us of — where have we seen feeling and immediately before? Sensory. Okay palimpsests everywhere in Hegel. These moment keep coming back at different levels and in different places. Good. Let me go [inaudible] and I'll come back to the text.

So the twist here is, in a moment of trying to be most aware of the unchanging, I become intensified in my own embodied, sensuous experience of feeling. So the very thing that I wanted to do — to devote myself to the other, to get into the other, to surrender to it — turns out to be a moment of feeling inwardness. Hence, rather than escaping my embodiment, I end up being immersed in it and indeed to such a degree that there's nothing else. Which indeed corresponds to, what we know, a moment in the phenomenology of religion. Always what Freud called the oceanic feeling right?  You just have the feeling of being absolutely overcome by the unconditioned.

[00:52:17]

So rather than feeling the other, it only feels itself and has fallen back into itself. And this thought must reverberate — the fact that it falls back into itself — on its conception of the other. So it tries to be with Christ by contemplating him, which is itself contradictory since Christ is not present but beyond and cannot be found. So the thought is, when the Unhappy Consciousness is so determined to put itself in relationship to Christ in his particularity, which is what ‘Ding!’ meant — next time I do this, I'll have a little bell. You want to get, in that context, by that act of individualizing Christ in that way, you end up ignoring the fact that such a particular is a mortal particular and is already dead and therefore not present.

So what happens now is you think, 'I still want to get in touch with that particular. So how am I going to do that? Well, I know he's dead, but if I can find his tomb, then at least I can put myself in touch with the mortal remains.' So we have the Crusades. The Crusades are an elaborated belief in that contact with Christ means contact with an actual concrete, finite individual who died at a particular time. So the thought here is that, when reaching out for the particular, Hegel argues, all that is really found is the grave of life.

I take it what Hegel means by this is that, when devotion begins the effort to subordinate its body to a transcendent object, it ends by taking the body, that is the self, feeling as its object of worship and letting the unchangeable spirit itself die. So death here operates as a kind of middle term. In his commentary, Harris puts it in the following way,

"The devout self knows what it is to be singular, and so whenever she seeks the singular shape of the unchangeable she sinks back into herself as the antithesis of the unchangeable. Christ has ascended into heaven. When I follow him there as a believer, I find myself. And as soon as I do that, I am conscious of my alien embodiment here in this world and opposed to the divine kingdom. The effective middle is death. The singularity of God in Christ is available to me here only as what is left to me of the dead Jesus. The status of the Risen Christ as the eternal singularity of the unchangeable in the beyond is represented in the world here and now by the grave."

Hence, the Crusades set off to find the grave of Christ.

[00:58:13]

What consciousness of course must do, and indeed needs to do, is discover that the grave is empty, and that the physical reality of the Savior is long gone. If the Savior is indeed objectively present when the bell is rung and the censer swings, then he is present in quite another way than the sensible, perceptible mode in which a flesh-and-blood person is present. So you might say that this form of consciousness, devotion, makes the mistake of what Whitehead calls the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. And the misplaced concreteness is the supposition that in order — something deep and something shallow here, and the deep in the shallow are in the same place.

The deep is the recognition that the unchangeable is not different in ontological status for me. It's a singular finite being. That's a great philosophical thought. Unfortunately, the Christian is not a philosopher and takes it literally as the actual unchanging essence sent down his Son to the Earth and therefore in order for me to get in touch with the unchangeable essence, I've got to get in touch with him. You know, make a telephone call, do something, go on a crusade. So there has to be — so the image of finitude generates the idea of physical contact. And therefore the imagery of the church — we have to be aware, the imagery of the Church is very complicated, because the imagery of the Church means to be two-sided, right. They do want to mean in the Eucharist that Christ is present.

They just don't know what that means. And now I'm suggesting that the experience of the structure of devotion and the Crusades are an account of one thing it cannot mean. That is, it cannot mean an actual relationship with an actual single physical individual who is solely the representative of the unchangeable consciousness.

[01:01:55]

Okay, any questions about that first moment of devotion?  Since the next move is work and labor.

Student: I'm a bit unclear, why isn't the Eucharist enough, why isn't the transubstantiation enough, to have that dual contact?  Why the Crusades?

Bernstein:  Because the Eucharist is only going to work if I can be actually touch with another. So the question is how do I get the other?  How does the otherness of the other..

Student: Isn't it supposed to be in the Eucharist though?

Bernstein: Yeah, it's supposed to be and I said that what happens in the Eucharist is a moment of feeling and it's feeling that drives me back into myself. So instead of being — so that's why Hegel says it's musical thinking, it's the jingling of bells, it's a sound.

Student: Doesn't the search for the grave do the same thing?

Bernstein: Yeah, it does. That's why they're in the same  paragraph. Hegel is thinking both of them are the same structure. The advantage of the empty grave is it makes explicit what is implicit, you're right, in the Eucharist, namely Christ the individual is dead. And therefore whatever it means to be in touch with him, it can't mean being in touch with a finite presence the way I am in touch with you. So the Eucharist wanted both, so the Eucharist has a moment of magical thinking.

So that's why Hegel says it's an approach to thinking, but it doesn't do it, right. It stops too early because it doesn't comprehend — so if, of course, you said, 'it's a representation, it's a metaphor.'  But then you're going to ruin it. They don't want a metaphor, right. Its literalness turns out to be the problem, because the literalness then is what throws it back into my experience and my experience absorbs it and drops the other out, and that becomes again exemplified or made explicit in searching out the Christ, the grave.

[01:04:45]

Student: [inaudible]

Bernstein: Well, that would be the right [inaudible]  to get a splinter or whatever. eBay is not what Hegel is worried about here. The eBay version of Christianity.

Student: I have a question about the death of Christ. If we have to acknowledge Christ is, in his individuality [inaudible], dfoesn’t return to the statement of unchanging essence without particularity whatsoever?  Because it seems it pulls us back from the second moment to the first moment as opposed to going anywhere [inaudible].

Bernstein:  And the answer is yes. So the problem is going to be that until this moment unpacks itself fully into this moment, it's going to keep — and this is why Russon rightly said — 'falling back into another moment.'  So of course part of that is — but why is it not the same as this moment?  Anyone?  It's important that it's not the same as this moment.

Student: Because of the event?

Bernstein: Because of the event, exactly. So it sets a task. The problem with this structure [indicates on board] is it's just a structure, right? So, of course that simplifies the fact that there's Abraham and there was a promise, but skip all that. If you just take roughly the Christian view of Judaism, it's the abstract law, God the lawgiver, outside time, outside history, outside nature, boom, done. Then there's nothing that's going to set a task. Christ promises redemption, promises universality, promises equality and promises, above all, reconciliation.

He promises that — and we have to be absolutely clear, this is one of the things Hegel is firm about. Actual Christianity, as opposed to a lot of ersatz Christianity, promised that there would be a resurrection of body and soul. So the reconciliation is really the reconciliation of God with the world that Christ promises. So we are to what come out of our fallen state. So being fallen, that is being finite, is no longer to be a sin. That's what we're being forgiven of, original sin. That is, our distance from God, that's to be closed.

[01:08:15]

Well, that's what Hegel finds attractive. At least it promises — not that we'll be saved in the beyond, he finds that worthless, not even worth thinking about. What he's interested in Christianity is it promises worldliness. So at least the crazy people who are looking for the rapture, [inaudible] are thinking about the right, no the wrong sort of things, they're going to taken up.

Student: In addition to setting the task though, and maybe this is what the task is, it produces desire. So you have this movement [inaudible] comic side to the ritual and you don't have that in the first...

Bernstein: Absolutely, right ,and that's why again this segues so easily into German Romanticism, which itself is the form of yearning, is the Unhappy Consciousness, is the beautiful soul. We're going to see all of this. Okay, so next week it turns out we will be continuing on with the Unhappy Consciousness [inaudible] and again we're trying to get to the transition to Reason.